NYSE

[Money]

Много любопитна статия де. Ето още:


The good news is money managers can now turn to a whole new world of alternative data, says Shen, a finance PhD who joined BlackRock through its 2009 acquisition of Barclays Global Investors.

“Once you get that data, you should look for alpha opportunity associated with that rather than put that data over a price number,” he said. “Once you put the price number in, it potentially destroys the effectiveness of that new data source.”

Shen’s systematic group hasn’t conducted research on the U.S. value factor for years now. In their view, price is fickle. It naturally dominates all valuation formulas. And that means such ratios become the product of historical returns rather than predictors of future moves.

To build portfolios, the group taps into social media to gauge employee sentiment, parses online job postings to see which firms are hiring and uses machine-learning algorithms to figure out how the myriad variables in their models interact with one another.

Value traditionalists counter that their rules-based strategy is built for the long haul and will ultimately bounce back after a decade of underperformance. Even among those harboring doubts, the consensus has been to fix it -- for instance by including intangible assets in book value -- rather than to abandon it entirely.

[Money]

БлакРок смятат, че текущите цени на акциите са мистерия, която не си заслужава да се разгадава


BlackRock Quant Sees Stock Valuation a Mystery Not Worth Solving


In the worldview of Jeff Shen, money managers need new investing methods because there’s no way to tell if betting on ostensibly cheap companies will work again. In fact, comparing share prices to fundamentals like corporate profits or book value is essentially futile in complex markets.

To fix misfiring quant strategies, the co-chief of the $106 billion systematic active equity group has a newfangled suggestion: Investors should scour alternative data for trading signals and end their obsession with valuation metrics.

“The market is looking at a billion of things that we only know a very small amount of,” Shen said in a telephone interview from San Francisco. “While the philosophical conversation is right in the sense that there should be some fundamentals relative to the price, how the market prices different fundamentals, different sentiment, different flows is pretty much a mystery to any one of us.”

Wall Street probably doesn’t want to hear that understanding stock valuations is effectively impossible, especially not from a 16-year executive at the world’s largest asset manager. But the idea will ring true for investors contemplating a potential bubble in tech and the S&P 500 within sight of its record, even as the coronavirus pandemic rages on.


https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...-worth-solving

[pipbel]

Дано и аз съм повлиял положително, защото от доста време тръбя за тях

Си, потвърждавам. Това му е доброто на тоя форум.
Видях преди 3г че нямам в тоя ъгъл на пазара нищо и не ми трябваше много маркет тайминг да им скоча на МК.

[Money]

Te почти идентични може се каже, ма все пак аз си предпочитам мастърите, може би щото и фамилията така се е случило та предимно такива да държим.
Вече 3та година си ги имам и като акции и доволен. Част от дългосрочния.

Масътрите растат по-бързо, в интерес на истината, но аз имам двойно повече Виза. Главно защото 2014-2015 не можех да купя техни акции. А после 2016 смятах, че Visa Inc. като лапнат Visa Europe и ще хвъркат повече... ама не. Здраве да е

Хубаво че имаш

Дано и аз съм повлиял положително, защото от доста време тръбя за тях

[pipbel]

[QUOTE=Muller;n3629189]

Barclays Research от 26 юни тази година


MasterCard Inc. (MA)

Visa Inc. (V)

Да Напълно реални таргет цени, при много нисък риск.

Te почти идентични може се каже, ма все пак аз си предпочитам мастърите, може би щото и фамилията така се е случило та предимно такива да държим.
Вече 3та година си ги имам и като акции и доволен. Част от дългосрочния.

[Money]

Виж специално и това за "алтернативите". Виза не са вчерашни

Един точно кениец ми разправяше в Лондон как M-Pesa ще изтикат картовите компании. Да, ама не

 Recent wins. Visa is excited about recent wins including Truist, the 6th largest bank in the U.S. (JPMe could add 1ppt to US volume), and TenCent (WeChat in China) and Safaricom (M-Pesa in Kenya - 24M users). The latter two add to momentum in nurturing relationships with wallets; such deals collectively bring the potential to embed Visa credentials in 2B wallets globally.

[Muller]

[QUOTE=Money;n3629184]Barclays Research от 26 юни тази година


MasterCard Inc. (MA)

Visa Inc. (V)

Да Напълно реални таргет цени, при много нисък риск.

[Money]

И тука вече JPM за Виза след Ковид-19


Visa Inc.

J.P. Morgan TMC Conference Takeaways

Visa CEO/Chairman, Al Kelly, presented at our TMC Conference this morning. There was no update on spend volume/KPIs, but tone was consistent with earnings call with a commitment to carrying out the strategy laid out at Investor Day. Below we summarize our key takeaways.

 COVID-19 accelerating the shift. Put simply, Visa believes COVID-19 will accelerate the displacement of cash. In response to COVID-19, Visa increased contactless price limits and has seen increased usage (60% of transactions outside of the U.S. are contactless) and renewed issuer interest in recent weeks. E-comm, where Visa has 43% share or 3x than in face-to-face market, and building presence in wallets (including previously closed ecosystems) should position Visa well to grow the digital category. Kelly sounded especially upbeat on Visa Direct (earned wage access) and Value Added Services (delivered ~50% more consulting projects in F2Q y/y) as opportunities perhaps underappreciated by the market. VAS represented ~15% of FY20 revenue, growing 2x pace of core.

 Visa is working closely with issuers and merchants to help them adapt to a post-COVID-19 world, including delaying planned network and interchange modifications, helping governments distribute wage and relief funds, and providing issuers and governments with data and analytics. Visa is open to supporting/working with digital currencies and remains engaged w/ Libra, but backed off initially due to regulatory concerns.

 Recent wins. Visa is excited about recent wins including Truist, the 6th largest bank in the U.S. (JPMe could add 1ppt to US volume), and TenCent (WeChat in China) and Safaricom (M-Pesa in Kenya - 24M users). The latter two add to momentum in nurturing relationships with wallets; such deals collectively bring the potential to embed Visa credentials in 2B wallets globally.

 Capital allocation largely unchanged. Visa remains committed to buying back $9B of stock this fiscal year, a testament to their confidence in the long-term secular trend. M&A strategy unchanged. The Plaid acquisition (and the wave of consolidation in payments) doesn’t signal a shift in Visa’s M&A strategy (i.e., don’t expect a surge in M&A). Areas of interest include risk/security, data, auth, and loyalty.

[Money]

Тука някакви работи за 2019 от JP Morgan Equity Research от 4 юни


MA/V

Payment Network Tale of the Tape (2019)

In this report, we look back to 2019 and compare key financial, operating and return metrics to better understand performance differences between Mastercard and Visa. Our analysis continues to be complicated by MA’s ongoing Maestro card conversion effort, which inflates reported card and volume growth metrics in certain regions. Where possible, we’ve tried to adjust for and/or highlight these factors. Bottom line, Mastercard outgrew Visa on most key metrics in ’19, but the growth discrepancy is not as dramatic as headline figures would suggest.

 Visa still the clear scale leader, Mastercard grows faster. Visa has greater scale, generating 80% more total volume than Mastercard, 39% more revenue and a ten-point operating margin premium, primarily due to better personnel and advertising expense leverage. Visa has 56% more cards outstanding and roughly two-thirds relative market share (based on purchase volume) globally. That said, Mastercard grows faster than Visa on many metrics (both operationally and financially) off a smaller base.

 Income statement analysis. MA enjoyed a two-point revenue and four-point adjusted EPS growth premium relative to V in 2019, on 90bps and 20bps in operating margin expansion, respectively. Since 2016, MA has enjoyed faster volume, revenue and EPS growth, and better margin expansion.

 Shareholder and financial returns. Both companies are extremely cash flow generative and returned substantially all of their adjusted net income to shareholders last year. Mastercard returned a slightly larger proportion as dividends and share repurchases increased ~30% from the prior year period, while Visa’s increased just 11%. Mastercard’s and Visa’s shares appreciated 58% and 42%, respectively, in 2019, versus a 29% rise in the S&P 500. YTD, MA and V shares are essentially flat, outperforming the S&P 500 by eight and six points, respectively, as we believe investors are looking past near-term COVID-19-related headwinds. Mastercard suspended buybacks, whereas Visa remains committed to fulfill its buyback target.

 Relative valuations. NTM P/E multiples have expanded in recent months as stock performance defied negative near-term estimate revisions. Today, Mastercard and Visa trade at ~41x and ~35x Street estimates, respectively, on an NTM P/E basis, a ~8x and 5x premium to their own one-year averages. MA trades at a 17% premium to Visa, versus three- and five-year averages of 10% and 6%, respectively. Both companies trade above their historical NTM P/E premium to the S&P 500, with MA and V trading at a 91% and 63% premium to the S&P, respectively, versus three-year averages of 75% and 60%. Earnings are depressed, as we see U.S. purchase volume declining this year (the first time in history), but trends seem to have shown sequential improvement in recent weeks, driven by relaxed shelter-in-place measures and secular tailwinds in e- commerce and contactless payments.





Table 1, below, compares key financial metrics from Mastercard and Visa. Visa has greater scale, generating nearly twice as much total volume as Mastercard, 39% more revenue and a ten-point operating margin premium. On a reported basis, Mastercard outgrew Visa on nearly every relevant measure in CY19. That said, comparability is complicated by a few factors including the fact Mastercard (1) excludes Maestro- and Cirrus-branded transactions from its volume metrics, which understates volume share in certain regions, while boosting revenue yields metrics, and (2) is in the process of reissuing several hundred million Maestro cards (as Mastercards), which inflates European card and certain volume growth metrics.

What does all this mean? Visa is considerably larger, Mastercard is growing faster, but the market share and growth differentials between the two companies are less dramatic than headline figures would suggest.




Other Takeaways

•  Visa added more cards in the U.S., while Mastercard added more globally.
  
  Visa added 64M consumer cards in the U.S. in the twelve months ended Dec ’19, while Mastercard added 27M. Globally, Mastercard added 175M cards, in the twelve months ended Dec ’19, while Visa added 38M. Mastercard has been aggressively converting its Maestro card portfolio to Mastercard, which has helped card and volume growth figures (as the converted cards and associated volume were excluded from Mastercard’s operating metrics previously). We think more than 70% of Mastercard’s global reported card growth is driven by Maestro card conversions.
•  Mastercard’s volume growth outpaces Visa’s, helped by Maestro conversion. Mastercard’s global purchase volume increased 13% on an FXN basis in ’19, four points ahead of Visa. A portion of Mastercard’s premium growth, particularly in Europe and Latin American, can be attributed to the ongoing Maestro conversion. Our sense is Mastercard will continue to post faster card and volume growth for the foreseeable future, as the conversion process is still in the early innings (there are ~440M remaining Maestro cards to convert). Helping matters are wins and faster growth at Fintechs, especially in Europe where Mastercard has an advantage. However, Visa has enjoyed some recent wins including Truist (SunTrust will leave Mastercard, costing them a little over two points of volume growth in the U.S.).
•  Visa better leverages Personnel and Advertising costs. Mastercard’s notional personnel spend is comparable to Visa’s, despite generating ~30% less revenue. Visa’s nominal marketing spend is slightly higher than Mastercard’s (V/MA at $1,005M/$934M). Personnel expense represents ~21% of Mastercard’s net revenues, but only 15% of Visa’s. Similarly, Advertising and Marketing expense represents ~6% of Mastercard’s net revenues, but only 4% of Visa’s.

[Money]

Barclays Research от 26 юни тази година


MasterCard Inc. (MA)

Valuation Methodology: Our $335 price target is derived from a blend of two valuation techniques, equally weighted: 1) relative P/E valuation, which yields a value of $319 per share, and 2) our discount cash flow (DCF) model, which yields a value of $3521 Relative P/E: We apply a multiple of 35x to our 2021 EPS estimate of $9.12. The multiple is a premium with the average P/E multiple of a group of merchant acquirer and network peers (based on 2020 consensus EPS estimates), reflecting MA's growth profile and potential for margin expansion. DCF: We assume free cash flow growth at a 9.1% CAGR from 2019 to 2028, a WACC of 7.9%, and a terminal growth rate of 3.5%.

Risks which May Impede the Achievement of the Barclays Research Valuation and Price Target: 1) Legal and regulatory issues, 2) competitive threats from geographies where regulators have cultivated local champions, 3) macroeconomic factors, 4) consumer spending, and 5) data security.



Visa Inc. (V)

Valuation Methodology: Our $220 price target is derived from a blend of two valuation techniques, equally weighted: 1) relative P/E valuation, which yields a value of $207 per share, and 2) our discount cash flow (DCF) model, which yields a value of $233. Relative P/E: We apply a multiple of 33x to our CY2021 EPS estimate of $6.26. The multiple is a premium to the average P/E multiple of a group of acquirers and issuer processors (based on 2019-20 consensus EPS estimates), reflecting the ongoing mix shift to tech-enabled payments that we expect to drive revenue acceleration at the company. DCF: We assume free cash flow growth at a 9.3% CAGR from 2019 to 2028, a WACC of 7.3%, and a terminal growth rate of 3.5%.

[Money]

Не смятам, че ги разбирам тези нещо по-добре от професионалните анализатори, ето тука една табличка от Bloomberg с усреднените estimate-и на анализаторите. EPS-а се очкава тази година да е 5.021, по-нисък от м.г., но да стигне 8.728 през 2023. По принцип за виза се очаква и 15-16% дългосрочен ръст на печалбите.

За Union Pay аз съм писал преди. Не мисля, че са чак такава заплаха. А освен това самите Виза и МастърКард пък са заплаха за Китайците, защото СТО ги натиска да либерализират пазара си на плащания и да допуснат Виза и МастърКард свободно в Китай. Те даже уж се съгласиха китайците ама протакат доста нещата. Но като цяло глобално потенциала за ръст на електронните плащания е огромен и има място и за други играчи

10/23/2023	FY 23	09/23				8,728
10/23/2022	FY 22	09/22				7,021
10/23/2021	FY 21	09/21				5,886
10/23/2020	FY 20	09/20				5,021
10/24/2019	FY 19	09/19		5,443	5,44	5,401
10/24/2018	FY 18	09/18		4,628	4,61	4,582
10/25/2017	FY 17	09/17		3,435	3,48	3,428
10/24/2016	FY 16	09/16		2,881	2,84	2,782
11/02/2015	FY 15	09/15		2,527	2,62	2,615
10/29/2014	FY 14	09/14		2,162	2,268	2,248
10/30/2013	FY 13	09/13		1,899	1,898	1,896
10/31/2012	FY 12	09/12		1,341	1,55	1,539
10/26/2011	FY 11	09/11		1,007	1,248	1,246
10/27/2010	FY 10	09/10		0,744	0,978	0,974
10/27/2009	FY 09	09/09		0,515	0,808	0,729

[Muller]

В Баден Баден е много яко, но не ме пуснаха в казината, защото... dress code. Бях по къси панталони и тенсика

Кои алтернативни те притесняват? Много от тях всъщност пак ползват Виза или МастърКард

Едно време можеше да си вземеш облекло под наем от техния гардероб, за да влезнеш-
Китайците с техните алтерантиви са основната заплаха според мен- Изхвърлих Велневата на 6 процента профит сега сядам да следя на приятелчето грипо компанията. Той е новак с много здрави т...ки и огромен късмет. Да видим този път ще му изневери ли късмета или ще удвои утрои за седмица и ще ми се пресмива здравото- Все избира такива екзотики, които не съм вярвал, че съществуват-
Каква цел на Визата виждаш идната петилетка?

[blqblq]

Ивелина, ако си помислиш за лимон, устата ти ще се напълни със слюнка, ако достатъчно време умишлено правиш някаква физиономия, ще последва и съответната емоция. Какво ли се случва, ако смяташ, че си лузър, карък и т.н?

[Money]

Значи аз 2014 препоръчвах на един колега да купи Виза и да държи 10 години. Той каза, че няма, защото навлизали Apple Pay. Еми аз го ползвах Епъл пей и всъщност то не е нищо друго совен да "качиш" Виза картата си на телефона. Примерно. И всъщност тази "алтернатива" е бича за Виза

А виж колко е загубил Алекс от тогава, дет не ме послуша Щеше да е 3.7х нагоре

При това аз това му го казах преди якия скок в края на 2014. Който сега на чарта изглежда дребен де... ама тогава беше много як скок

[Money]

В Баден Баден е много яко, но не ме пуснаха в казината, защото... dress code. Бях по къси панталони и тенсика

Кои алтернативни те притесняват? Много от тях всъщност пак ползват Виза или МастърКард

Еми. Комара е заразителен. Днес едно приятелче влезна в грипна компания с хиляди евра при положение, че от 0,15 цента в момента е 6,80 евро. За тръпката с дребни пари става ама да влизаш здраво безумие- По добре на рулетката в Баден Баден или в Дортмунд там по-малко лъжат-
Иначе Визата препоръчана от тебе е интересна опция за дълго държане сравнително нисък риск, но алтернативните електронни разплащания като че ли и пречат и това се вижда от графиката.