NYSE

[Todor Sabev]

Освен митата като санкции и контра санкции има и други оръжия.
Тук Китайците , могат да най силно да противодействат на Америка като най голям чуждестранен купувач на американски дълг. Ако замразят покупките на американски дълг ще стане интересно. Може и други засегнати да ги последват. Разбира се ако се стигне до там.

[pipbel]

Човекът е бил афектиран и ядосан. Искал е да си го изкара на някого и хоп, търговска война...

Сега през уикенда Мелания ще го утеши, той ще си пие валерианата и другата седмица ще си промени мнението. Да се надяваме.

Има да си чакаш...
Да го отдаваш на емоции или кой може и кой не може да му повлияе е несериозно.
Той просто си изпълнява едно от основните предизборни обещания, не му пука за никой друг, знае много добре кой и защо го е избрал.

Mar 3, 2018 12:43:26 PM - The United States has an $800 Billion Dollar Yearly Trade Deficit because of our “very stupid” trade deals and policies. Our jobs and wealth are being given to other countries that have taken advantage of us for years. They laugh at what fools our leaders have been. No more!

А междувременно е дал май шах на европа с пешката, ще гледаме сеир...

Mar 3, 2018 12:53:50 PM - If the E.U. wants to further increase their already massive tariffs and barriers on U.S. companies doing business there, we will simply apply a Tax on their Cars which freely pour into the U.S. They make it impossible for our cars (and more) to sell there. Big trade imbalance!

[HY Spread]

Според мене трябва да се "засекат" повече данни, за да се правят прогнози за идваща рецесия. Ако фокуса е предимно върху HY spread-а и волатилността може да се стигне и до грешни изводи. Края на 2015 и началото на 2016 тези два показатела даваха сигнал за рецесия, но нещата не се развиха така.





За ВИКС-а беше абсолютно прав и много точно нацели момента. Браво!

И няма нужда да е рецесия. Виж волатилността как се нормализира. Очаквам това и при спредовете

[HY Spread]

Според мене трябва да се "засекат" повече данни, за да се правят прогнози за идваща рецесия. Ако фокуса е предимно върху HY spread-а и волатилността може да се стигне и до грешни изводи. Края на 2015 и началото на 2016 тези два показатела даваха сигнал за рецесия, но нещата не се развиха така.





За ВИКС-а беше абсолютно прав и много точно нацели момента. Браво!

Прочети цялата статия

[Money]

Според мене трябва да се "засекат" повече данни, за да се правят прогнози за идваща рецесия. Ако фокуса е предимно върху HY spread-а и волатилността може да се стигне и до грешни изводи. Края на 2015 и началото на 2016 тези два показатела даваха сигнал за рецесия, но нещата не се развиха така.

Разбира се че не винаги, но предимно. Както казах: много стандртни tools не работят и това е резултат от неадекватна финансова политика. Като си писахме последният път ти казах че залагам на волатилност. Сега бавно гледам за добри спредове

За ВИКС-а беше абсолютно прав и много точно нацели момента. Браво!

[HY Spread]

Според мене не винаги кредитният пазар е водещ. Даже в повечето случаи май не е. Примерно точно преди самото начало на кризата през април 2007 волатилността скача от 10 на 16, а в същото време спреда на CCC rated debt продължава да пада до май 2007.

Всъщност ти не генерализираш ли прекалено това, което стана в средата на 2014 до началото на 2016? HY пазарът беше водещ, защото цената на петрола започна да пада и защото голяма част от HY са компании за шистови горива.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=iPa9

Разбира се че не винаги, но предимно. Както казах: много стандртни tools не работят и това е резултат от неадекватна финансова политика. Като си писахме последният път ти казах че залагам на волатилност. Сега бавно гледам за добри спредове

[Money]

Според мене не винаги кредитният пазар е водещ. Даже в повечето случаи май не е. Примерно точно преди самото начало на кризата през април 2007 волатилността скача от 10 на 16, а в същото време спреда на CCC rated debt продължава да пада до май 2007.

Всъщност ти не генерализираш ли прекалено това, което стана в средата на 2014 до началото на 2016? HY пазарът беше водещ, защото цената на петрола започна да пада и защото голяма част от HY са компании за шистови горива.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=iPa9

One piece I put recently...

However, what we normally see is that credit markets lead: the premiums on HY bonds tend to widen even a year before we see higher equity volatility. This demonstrates again how the central banks distorted some of the traditional risk management frameworks. But maybe this time is the other way around: the normalization of the equity volatility will feed into the credit markets and the credit spreads will move to higher territory. That investors are very sensitive to shifts in the volatility regime is especially pronounced in the HY credit markets. These layers of the credit market react as first to any jitters in the capital markets as recently in equity:

[Money]

Човекът е бил афектиран и ядосан. Искал е да си го изкара на някого и хоп, търговска война...

Сега през уикенда Мелания ще го утеши, той ще си пие валерианата и другата седмица ще си промени мнението. Да се надяваме.


According to two officials, Trump's decision to launch a potential trade war was born out of anger at other simmering issues and the result of a broken internal process that has failed to deliver him consensus views that represent the best advice of his team.

On Wednesday evening, the president became "unglued," in the words of one official familiar with the president's state of mind.

A trifecta of events had set him off in a way that two officials said they had not seen before: Hope Hicks' testimony to lawmakers investigating Russia's interference in the 2016 election, conduct by his embattled attorney general and the treatment of his son-in-law by his chief of staff.

Trump, the two officials said, was angry and gunning for a fight, and he chose a trade war, spurred on by Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and Peter Navarro, the White House director for trade — and against longstanding advice from his economic chair Gary Cohn and Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin.

[Money]

Говори се, че Джон Кели е играл ключова роля в това Гари Кон, Мнучин и Тилерсън да надделеят над Рос и Наваро.

Надявам се да се намерят механизми при новата конфигурация най-гениалните идеи на Тръмп да бъдат спирани.

Не те ли заболя ръката да пействаш с тия тарифи.....а Той рече и отсече че е много просто

https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/...25362580484098

[Money]

Интересно интервю за икономическите течения:


http://economicrockstar.libsyn.com/1...f-money-part-1

[Protokol]

Гледай какво ще стане ако някой се изцепи, че това е добре за американската икономика ...

Зелено...

[Protokol]

Не те ли заболя ръката да пействаш с тия тарифи.....а Той рече и отсече че е много просто

https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/...25362580484098

Гледай какво ще стане ако някой се изцепи, че това е добре за американската икономика ...

[pipbel]

Не те ли заболя ръката да пействаш с тия тарифи.....а Той рече и отсече че е много просто

https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/...25362580484098

[Money]

И отговорът на ЕС към Тръмп: и ние ще наложим мита като ответна реакция.


The EU will consider imposing its own “safeguard” tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium in response to US president Donald Trump’s decision to levy national security tariffs on imports of the metals from around the world, the EU’s top trade official has warned.

In an interview with the Financial Times, Cecilia Malmstrom, EU trade commissioner, said officials in Brussels would wait for the formal announcement of US tariffs, which Mr Trump said would come next week, before taking any action.

But in a sign of why trade experts fear Mr Trump’s move on tariffs could quickly escalate into a trade war, Ms Malmstrom warned that the EU would have no choice but to respond, echoing warnings from other countries likely to be affected, such as Brazil and Canada.



Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, also said the EU would respond. “The EU has been a close security ally of the US for decades. We will not sit idly while our industry is hit with unfair measures that put thousands of European jobs at risk,” he said.

[HY Spread]

One piece I put recently...

In the previous article we went through some stylized facts inherent in volatility which enjoy a well-documented degree of predictive power. Now we want to go a step further and address the link between volatility and credit markets.

Do you remember the fancy collateralized debt obligation (CDO) during the financial crisis in 2008? Think about volatility (XIV ETNs) as a part of a CDO like structure. The CDO is sliced into tranches, which capture the cash flow of different payments in sequence based on seniority. The lowest trance, the equity tranche, or the first loss piece is our XIV ETNs. So what is next in the capital structure and what we shall be paying attention to? Maybe high yield bonds?

The existing theoretical literature and frameworks uniformly suggests a positive relationship between stock volatility and credit spreads of primarily HY corporate bonds as higher volatility corresponds to a higher probability of default.

However, what we normally see is that credit markets lead: the premiums on HY bonds tend to widen even a year before we see higher equity volatility. This demonstrates again how the central banks distorted some of the traditional risk management frameworks. But maybe this time is the other way around: the normalization of the equity volatility will feed into the credit markets and the credit spreads will move to higher territory. That investors are very sensitive to shifts in the volatility regime is especially pronounced in the HY credit markets. These layers of the credit market react as first to any jitters in the capital markets as recently in equity:

However, many of us could say: yes, we see this but the recent calamity will fade away. But keep in mind: Volatility tends to cluster (meaning that high volatility is likely to be followed by high volatility periods, and vice-versa). In addition, there are several catalysts which could accelerate and be supportive for this channel:

1) The credit spreads are at very tight levels reminiscent of the levels before the financial crisis in 2008 (we saw some pick up recently following the equity volatility outburst)

2) Credit markets have grown considerably since the financial crisis. Low rates and easy liquidity drove a need for yield, which led to significant demand for credit. Spreads compressed, and all-time low yields incentivized companies to issue debt. According to data from Morgan Stanley the US credit market index debt rose by more than 120% (8,000bn US) compared to 2008.

3) Credit quality has deteriorated: There were significant shifts from higher grade rating (AAA to A) to lower grade rating (BBB). Looked at another way, the lower-quality part of the IG market (rated BBB) combined with the HY and loan indices makes more than 60% of total corporate debt today. We are basically at point where we could see a lot of downgrades toward HY sector once we see shift in the credit cycle.

4) The corporate balance sheet leverage has been constantly creeping higher. High levels of leverage on a weighted average basis precede a spread widening. According Société Générale investors should focus on this leverage ratio when considering how (corporate) bond markets will perform in 2018.

5) Normalization of the volatility of treasuries as a result of the unwinding central balance sheets, higher inflation (expectation) and rising interest rates (higher term premium). A key aspect whether this is a short-term technical equity turbulence, which quickly reverses, or the beginning of gradual shift among other asset classes, lies in where rates volatility goes from here. The long-term average for the Move index, the bond market's equivalent of the VIX, is about 96 if we take into account all time series back to the 1980. We already know that volatility is mean reverting…

6) In addition, to point 5) it is very interesting that a large position in mortgage (1.8tn USD) has to be offloaded until 2021 into the market. Mortgages enjoy a prepayment option which is employed when interest rates go down (negative convexity) and their duration lengths when the interest goes up. However, FED does not hedge its exposure with interest swaps and give this option to rest of the market increasing volatility by a change in the interest rate regime. Some market participants even called it the Bernanke straddle as when the FED buys mortgages takes interest rate risk out of the market it reduces the volatility of yields and reduces the risk premium embedded into longer-term interest rates and vice versa. Normally traders and other market participants hedge this by mean of interest rate swaps. In practice, this often means buying duration (betting swap rates will fall) when mortgage rates go down and selling duration (betting swap rates will rise) when mortgage rates go up. So the market could end up in a messy volatility trap similar to the XIV ETNs. Here the market rebalancing increased realised volatility, which pushed up implied volatility and the VIX, and because of that the XIV ETNs imploded. A sudden initial rise in medium- to long-term rates can therefore trigger a self-reinforcing sell-off in treasury yields and related fixed income markets, a convexity event where hedgers collectively attempt to decrease duration risk by selling treasury securities.

7) Positive correlations among asset classes transferring an idiosyncratic risk in on asset class to a macro risk.

8) Low liquidity due to regulation

So there is no surprise as we saw recently heavy outflows from HY market:


We need to remind ourselves some basic fixed income usances: Jason Voss (“A Bond Convexity Primer”) gives a very good example of duration and convexity: convexity is known as the rate of change in change. For convexity to make better sense, he compares it to driving a car. When you are driving a car your speed is the rate of change in the car’s location. Want to change your speed (i.e., the rate of change)? Then you either give the car more gas with the accelerator or press down on the brakes to slow the car down. Speeding up and slowing down are the second derivative. Speeding up means that there is a positive second derivative, while slowing down means that there is a negative second derivative. Related to the bond market, the speed of your car is called duration, while the speeding up/slowing down is known as convexity. The higher the convexity, the more dramatic the change in price given a move in interest rates. Whatever you call it, after a while, if you keep braking a car it stops. After a while, if your bond is experiencing negative convexity, it also slows down/loses value. The harder the acceleration or braking, the greater the change in your speed.

The central banks moved lot of fixed income managers into higher duration in order to be compensated for lower yields. We know that bonds with higher duration are more sensitive to changes in interest rates. As a result investors hold bonds with higher sensitive than they did few years ago. In addition, most of the HY bonds exhibit negative convexity due to their optional features. The increase in duration resulted in larger losses for the bond relative to an equivalent non-callable bond when rates rise and vice versa: when duration declined, resulting in a smaller gain relative to a non-callable bond. The negative convexity of the bond enhanced the downside during a sell-off and limited the upside during a rally. The holder of the bond not only suffered a mark-to-market loss, but has to manage higher duration investment that continues to suffer from negative convexity. So owning negative convexity bonds (HY bonds) is maybe not a good idea in environment of higher volatility and rising interest rates… We might see interesting times in the bond markets.