NYSE

[pirdop]

Richard Christopher Whalen is an investment banker and author who lives in New York City. He is Chairman of Whalen Global Advisors LLC and focuses on the financial services, mortgage finance and technology sectors. Christopher is a member of FINRA and is associated with Bradley Woods & Co in New York.

From 2014 through 2017, Christopher was Senior Managing Director and Head of Research at Kroll Bond Rating Agency, where he was responsible for ratings by the firm’s Financial Institutions and Corporate Ratings Groups. He was a co-founder and principal of Institutional Risk Analytics from 2003 through 2013.

Over the past three decades, Chris worked as a writer and financial professional in Washington, New York and London. He has held positions in organizations such as the House Republican Conference Committee, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bear, Stearns & Co., Prudential Securities, and Carrington Mortgage Holdings.

Christopher holds a B.A. in History from Villanova University. He is the author of three books, including his most recent work “Ford Men: From Inspiration to Enterprise” (2017), a study of Ford Motor Co and the Ford family published by Laissez Faire Books. He is the author of "Inflated: How Money and Debt Built the American Dream" (2010) published by John Wiley & Sons; and co-author of “Financial Stability: Fraud, Confidence & the Wealth of Nations,” also published by John Wiley & Sons.

Christopher is a member of the Economic Advisory Committee of FINRA. He is on the board of directors of the Global Interdependence Center (GIC) in Philadelphia. Christopher previously served as a fellow of Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University (2008-2014) and as a member of the Finance Department Advisory Council at the Villanova School of Business (2013-2016).

Christopher edits The Institutional Risk Analyst newsletter and contributes to other publications such as Zero Hedge, American Banker, Housing Wire and The National Interest. He has testified before Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on a range of financial, economic and political issues. He appears regularly in such media outlets as CNBC, Bloomberg, Fox News and Business News Network. Christopher is active in social media under the Twitter handle “rcwhalen”.

https://www.macrovoices.com/289-chri...ready-to-crash

Erik: Let’s move on to the US equity market. We’ve had a lot of people on the program arguing that the market is way overvalued, this thing is overdone, it just has to crash here, the top has to be in. Yet it continues to march higher. And we’ve also heard the other opposite argument, which is that there’s so much new liquidity in the system in terms of the feds supporting the market, even if we’re supposedly talking about shrinking the balance sheet now it’s shrinking very slowly. Which way do you see this, or where do you think it’s going? What’s your outlook for short, medium, long-term in the equity markets?



Chris: Equity markets are clearly overvalued. They’re very much like what you see in the residential real estate market in the United States and also in commercial real estate. The Fed manipulated the credit markets, they took four trillion dollars’ worth of securities out of the market, and they’ve essentially forced all of us to invest in something else. And so you’ve had a situation where low interest rates have driven money into stocks.



You’ve also had companies buying back their stock because debt is so cheap. Look at IBM. They’ve a negative book value for the company now, because they’ve levered up so much and bought back so much stock. And so you have a scarcity of supply. And so I would not disagree at all with your other guests that the stocks are overvalued.



The Street keeps coming up with rationales why that’s not so, but I think it’s clear that it is. But on the other hand, do I expect the market to crash? No. Because, remember, the constraint here is supply. And there’s so much money looking to invest that it’s going into all of the possible asset classes and in some cases into surreal asset classes like bitcoin and all of these digital currencies.



It’s very much a function of the central banks. And I think that’s a problem, because when we “normalize” interest rates we’re going to see a lot of credit losses on the books of banks and bond investors because crappy companies are able to go out and borrow money like they were good companies. Thanks to Janet Yellen. There is a cost to the social engineering that the Federal Reserve Board engages in, and, you know, I think it’s going to—over time the history is not going to be kind to Yellen and her colleagues. Because they have created the next problem. We just haven’t gotten there yet. Rising interest rates could quickly expose the companies’ “short-term thinking” surrounding how we paid for buybacks.”

Много точно казано, въпросе е кога ще дръпнат шалтера,

ясно е че в момента в който QE спре, доста маймуни ще падат от клоновете. Гледам че даже вече и в БГ се пробутват дялове от взаимни фондове, разни акции и т.н. всякакви инструменти от банките в търсене на някаква доходност! Само дето никой не обяснява на хората за какви рискове говорим. Балона само ще се надуе още повече щом куцо, кьораво и сакато се втурнат на борсата. В моменти надуха балоня с НИ, като най-достъпна 'инвестиция', стадото скочи. Всичко живо купува за да отдава под наем, е накрая кой ще взима под наем, питам аз? Я отгоре на всичко не малка част от тези имоти са на левъридж - ипотеки+ плаващи лихви. И това не е само в БГ ами в цяла Европа, САЩ.
големия въпрос е дали централните банки изобщо ще спрат с разхлабената политика. Вижте Япония те там тая игра я играха и там не свърши никак добре.

[Black and white cat-foot]

Richard Christopher Whalen is an investment banker and author who lives in New York City. He is Chairman of Whalen Global Advisors LLC and focuses on the financial services, mortgage finance and technology sectors. Christopher is a member of FINRA and is associated with Bradley Woods & Co in New York.

From 2014 through 2017, Christopher was Senior Managing Director and Head of Research at Kroll Bond Rating Agency, where he was responsible for ratings by the firm’s Financial Institutions and Corporate Ratings Groups. He was a co-founder and principal of Institutional Risk Analytics from 2003 through 2013.

Over the past three decades, Chris worked as a writer and financial professional in Washington, New York and London. He has held positions in organizations such as the House Republican Conference Committee, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bear, Stearns & Co., Prudential Securities, and Carrington Mortgage Holdings.

Christopher holds a B.A. in History from Villanova University. He is the author of three books, including his most recent work “Ford Men: From Inspiration to Enterprise” (2017), a study of Ford Motor Co and the Ford family published by Laissez Faire Books. He is the author of "Inflated: How Money and Debt Built the American Dream" (2010) published by John Wiley & Sons; and co-author of “Financial Stability: Fraud, Confidence & the Wealth of Nations,” also published by John Wiley & Sons.

Christopher is a member of the Economic Advisory Committee of FINRA. He is on the board of directors of the Global Interdependence Center (GIC) in Philadelphia. Christopher previously served as a fellow of Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University (2008-2014) and as a member of the Finance Department Advisory Council at the Villanova School of Business (2013-2016).

Christopher edits The Institutional Risk Analyst newsletter and contributes to other publications such as Zero Hedge, American Banker, Housing Wire and The National Interest. He has testified before Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on a range of financial, economic and political issues. He appears regularly in such media outlets as CNBC, Bloomberg, Fox News and Business News Network. Christopher is active in social media under the Twitter handle “rcwhalen”.

https://www.macrovoices.com/289-chri...ready-to-crash

Erik: Let’s move on to the US equity market. We’ve had a lot of people on the program arguing that the market is way overvalued, this thing is overdone, it just has to crash here, the top has to be in. Yet it continues to march higher. And we’ve also heard the other opposite argument, which is that there’s so much new liquidity in the system in terms of the feds supporting the market, even if we’re supposedly talking about shrinking the balance sheet now it’s shrinking very slowly. Which way do you see this, or where do you think it’s going? What’s your outlook for short, medium, long-term in the equity markets?



Chris: Equity markets are clearly overvalued. They’re very much like what you see in the residential real estate market in the United States and also in commercial real estate. The Fed manipulated the credit markets, they took four trillion dollars’ worth of securities out of the market, and they’ve essentially forced all of us to invest in something else. And so you’ve had a situation where low interest rates have driven money into stocks.



You’ve also had companies buying back their stock because debt is so cheap. Look at IBM. They’ve a negative book value for the company now, because they’ve levered up so much and bought back so much stock. And so you have a scarcity of supply. And so I would not disagree at all with your other guests that the stocks are overvalued.



The Street keeps coming up with rationales why that’s not so, but I think it’s clear that it is. But on the other hand, do I expect the market to crash? No. Because, remember, the constraint here is supply. And there’s so much money looking to invest that it’s going into all of the possible asset classes and in some cases into surreal asset classes like bitcoin and all of these digital currencies.



It’s very much a function of the central banks. And I think that’s a problem, because when we “normalize” interest rates we’re going to see a lot of credit losses on the books of banks and bond investors because crappy companies are able to go out and borrow money like they were good companies. Thanks to Janet Yellen. There is a cost to the social engineering that the Federal Reserve Board engages in, and, you know, I think it’s going to—over time the history is not going to be kind to Yellen and her colleagues. Because they have created the next problem. We just haven’t gotten there yet. Rising interest rates could quickly expose the companies’ “short-term thinking” surrounding how we paid for buybacks.”

[Misho ILIEV]

нищо не са тези 1.5 милиарда за такива пазари

Това е само пример. Пасивните са взели, мисля, 16-17% от американския пазар на акции и постоянно растат. Така че ако някой гледа на цената на акциите от гледна точка на "прилив" на пари, това не е за пренебрегване.

[Black and white cat-foot]

Сред всички други фактори, които бутат индексите нагоре е и това, че инвеститорите се прехвърлят от активен в пасивен мениджмънт. Ефектът идва от там, че активните фондове държат средно по 3% кеш, а пасивните не държат почти никакъв кеш. Така, като се прехвърлят 50 млрд. от активен в пасивен, едни допълнителни 1.5 млрд. които до тогава са били в кеш се "вливат" в акции.



https://www.ft.com/content/090e22ec-...e-68d53499ed71

нищо не са тези 1.5 милиарда за такива пазари

[Misho ILIEV]

Сред всички други фактори, които бутат индексите нагоре е и това, че инвеститорите се прехвърлят от активен в пасивен мениджмънт. Ефектът идва от там, че активните фондове държат средно по 3% кеш, а пасивните не държат почти никакъв кеш. Така, като се прехвърлят 50 млрд. от активен в пасивен, едни допълнителни 1.5 млрд. които до тогава са били в кеш се "вливат" в акции.

Holders of passive funds are, then, generally terrible market timers, buying at the top and selling at the bottom. They could also, by buying now, be contributing to the top. The average active equity fund keeps about 3 per cent in cash, according to the Investment Company Institute, while passive funds have negligible cash. Thus a switch of $50bn from active equity funds to passive, intended merely to reduce costs rather than to time the market, leads to an extra $1.5bn being put to work buying stocks. This is helping push the market up and could yet work in reverse if investors start to sell on the way down.

https://www.ft.com/content/090e22ec-...e-68d53499ed71

[Misho ILIEV]

Прайслайн - най-добре менажираната интернет компания след Amazon. The Economist пишат за "скритото" бижу на тех индустрията.

As titans like Google, Facebook and Amazon hog the limelight, other firms can go unnoticed. One that deserves more attention is Priceline, the world’s largest online-travel company.

[...]

Today it is a Goliath. Its stable of online sites for booking hotels, cars, flights and restaurants spans the world and includes Booking.com, Kayak, Agoda and OpenTable. Over the past decade Priceline’s pre-tax earnings have grown at a compound annual rate of 42%, faster than Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Alphabet (see chart). It also boasts a 96% gross margin. Its share price has risen by more than 50% over the past 12 months, about four times faster than the broader stockmarket. On July 26th the firm’s market value rose above $100bn.

[...]

Perhaps because Priceline is based in Connecticut, not Silicon Valley, it is often overlooked by geeks and technology investors, who revere Airbnb, a platform for booking overnight stays in other people’s homes which is valued at around $30bn. Ask an entrepreneur in San Francisco about Priceline, and you are likely to get a blank stare.

The most important reason for Priceline’s success is shrewd dealmaking. In 2005 it paid around $135m to buy Booking.com, a Dutch website that aggregates hotel inventory, and merged it with another acquisition, a British travel site called Active Hotels. Today Booking.com has the world’s largest supply of hotel accommodation and accounts for the lion’s share of Priceline’s revenue and market value. Booking.com was one of the best deals “in the history of the internet”, says Mark Mahaney of RBC Capital, an investment bank.

Малко тъжно е това, че booking.com първоначално е европейски бизнес, продаден за жълти стотинки (от днешна гледна точка) на американската priceline.com.

http://www.economist.com/news/busine...travel-company

[Misho ILIEV]

Ако не бях във фитнеса към края на сесията, може би щях да си щипна още малко Старбъкс на под $54.

[Protokol]

че то го взе и даже било прието от сената. тази хост-медия го отрази даже на 2 пъти, ако се не лъжа

от днес ето я статията им:

http://www.investor.bg/sasht/337/a/a...i-iran-243831/

Не, тия дни го чакаме... и първо да туитне нещо
http://www.4investors.de/php_fe/inde...115972#ref=rss

[Ferry]

Кога се очаква да вземе решение Тръмп за санкциите срещу Русия ? Мисля, че ще добър момент за пазар .. напр. Газпром

че то го взе и даже било прието от сената. тази хост-медия го отрази даже на 2 пъти, ако се не лъжа

от днес ето я статията им:

http://www.investor.bg/sasht/337/a/a...i-iran-243831/

[Protokol]

Кога се очаква да вземе решение Тръмп за санкциите срещу Русия ? Мисля, че ще добър момент за пазар .. напр. Газпром

[Ferry]

[Misho ILIEV]

Дискусията много силно се измества от пъроначалния въпрос за ефекта от свиване на баланса на Феда върху множителите. За да се даде отговор на подобен въпрос трябва да се гледат релевантине фактори.

За мен е сигурно, че централните банкери не им е комфортно да ги разнасят по всички медии. В миналото са вдигали и сваляли лихвите без толкова шум. Сега са звездите на финансовите пазари. Аз ги разглеждам повече като жертва. Поставени пред кашата 2007-08, нямат друг избор, освен да спасят положението. Иначе я щяло да стане като през Депресията - затворени банки, масова паника и т.н.

Не казвам, че им е комфортно. Всичко се крепи на тях, политиците не си вършат работата и направо не знаят на кой свят са. А централните банкери са тотално неразбрани от обещството. Няма как да им е комфортно.

Но от друга страна най-важната функция на централните банки е да се справят с подобни кризисни положения. Федът е създаден през 1913г. в отговор на масовата паника от 1907г.

Последните 10 години, централните банки спечелиха време за да бъдат коригирани грешки от преди кризата - дълговете да се намалят, системите да се реформират и да започнат да функционират по-добре. Като гледам - нищо от това не се свърши. Продължаваме по същия грешен път, залагайки че финансовия сектор е решението на проблема.

Според мене трябва да се прави ясно разграничение между дълбоките структурни проблеми в глобален мащаб и причините за финансовата криза. Финансовата криза си беше една типична ликвидна криза, макар и механизмът да беше доста по сложен от типичните ликвидни кризи от 19 и 20 век.

Казваш, че дори лихвите да се вдигнат с 0.75%, няма да е краят. Така е. Но след като основната лихва сега е 1%, това ще е значително относително покачване. Нямам точна представа, но мога да допусна, че разходите за обслужването на дълговете на компаниите ще скочат с едно 20-30% поне, след като толкова дълго лихвите бяха на дъното.

Имах предвид номиналните лихвите по 10г. ДЦК, които така или иначе, вървят между 1.4% и 3% в последните пет години. Ако вдигането с 0.75% в резултат на свиванете но баланса на Феда стане в рамките на 3 години това не би трябвало да има сериозно отражение връху компаниите само по себе си. Подобни движения на лихвата по 10г ДЦК си е съвсем нормално явление.

Ключовото в цялостната картина е икономиката да заработи. Ако успеят да върнат развитите икономика раста поне на 3% и то устойчиво, деливъриджът ще стане възможен и може да избегнем сценариите, които ми се вървят. Така или иначе, това е твърде макро за мен и не се опитвам нито да го предвидя, още по-малко пък да печеля, защото за мен си е чисто гадаене какво ще стане.

Най-евтиният начин за стимулиране на икономиката е business and consumer confidence да постигнат, т.нар. escape velocity.

[pirdop]

https://www.oaktreecapital.com/insig...rd-marks-memos

The large positions occupied by the top recent performers – with their swollen market caps – mean that as ETFs attract capital, they have to buy large amounts of these stocks, further fueling their rise. Thus, in the current up-cycle, over-weighted, liquid, large-cap stocks have benefitted from forced buying on the part of passive vehicles, which don’t have the option to refrain from buying a stock just because its overpriced.



Like the tech stocks in 2000, this seeming perpetual motion machine is unlikely to work forever. If funds ever flow out of equities and thus ETFs, what has been disproportionately bought will have to be disproportionately sold. It’s not clear where index funds and ETFs will find buyers for their over-weighted, highly appreciated holdings if they have to sell in a crunch. In this way, appreciation that was driven by passive buying is likely to eventually turn out to be rotational, not perpetual.

понякога факта че не си ''инвестирал'' е по-добрата инвестиция.... по=добре да не запишеш огромни загуби, отколкото малки печалби... проста теория на вероятностите!

в сегашната ситуяция макроикономически два са най=вероятните сценария:

1. Влизаме в нещо подобно на японския сценарии при който централните банки ще изкупят де що има след едно голямо бум.
Това така ще удари имотните спекуланти че ще си го спомнят цял живот! Графиката по=долу е почти същата и за housing
На който му се чете: http://www.thebubblebubble.com/japan-bubble/

Пак казвам ня,а да е същото, но нещо подобно. за тези които ще кажат че спендинг-а pattern-а на японеца и западняка за различни и както и възрастовата дистрибуция на населението

2, Централните банки продължават със затягането при което ни вкарват в поредната цикличната рецесиика

и при двата варианта хич не е да добре да си лонг поне в краткосрочно и средносрочно (следващите 2-3 години). Имайте предвид и че на бате Юнкер му свършва мандата 2019-а и това наливане на принтиран ресурс в кухи компании ала КТБ ще секне.

на микро ниво може да има time-lag от една-две години но това е

така че следващите 5 годинки ще са интересни.

Който има топки може да си играе на казино, защото в момента е точно това казино, успех! Риска е просто прекалено голямо
дали ще минем нивата на дот ком? исторически погледнато е доста вероятно, струва ли си дребна цаца като нас тук риска - не мисля

[Black and white cat-foot]

https://www.oaktreecapital.com/insig...rd-marks-memos

The large positions occupied by the top recent performers – with their swollen market caps – mean that as ETFs attract capital, they have to buy large amounts of these stocks, further fueling their rise. Thus, in the current up-cycle, over-weighted, liquid, large-cap stocks have benefitted from forced buying on the part of passive vehicles, which don’t have the option to refrain from buying a stock just because its overpriced.



Like the tech stocks in 2000, this seeming perpetual motion machine is unlikely to work forever. If funds ever flow out of equities and thus ETFs, what has been disproportionately bought will have to be disproportionately sold. It’s not clear where index funds and ETFs will find buyers for their over-weighted, highly appreciated holdings if they have to sell in a crunch. In this way, appreciation that was driven by passive buying is likely to eventually turn out to be rotational, not perpetual.

[arbeitmachtfrei]

Икономиката няма да заработи, защото техитата я убиват. Погледнете отчетите. Разбиват просто. Огромни приходи, минимум служители.
Каква инфлация, какви пет лева. Броят на хората на непълна затост непрекъснато расте.