Ще има ли война Украйна - Русия / Конфликтът Хамас-Израел

[barbaron]

Полша заявява, че възнамерява да приеме ядрени оръжия на САЩ в отговор на разполагането на руски оръжия в Беларус

Това заяви днес полският министър-председател Матеуш Моравецки.

По думите му Полша иска да участва в програмата на НАТО за съвместно използване на ядрени оръжия във връзка с разполагането на ядрени оръжия от Русия в Беларус.

[barbaron]

[Gerasim_Burgaski]

След Първата Световна Война, Русия е една от държавите, които искат България да се изтрие от картата и да бъде разпокъсана между Сърбия, Румъния, Гърция и Турция.
Русия фактически подписва документ за това в опит да ни заличи като народ и държава!
В този момент президентът на САЩ Томас Удроу Уилсън прекъсва диалога и като победител във Войната се обявява против заявявайки, че в никакъв случай няма да допусне стар народ, в една от най-старите държави в Европа със собствена идентичност да бъде заличен. Президентът парира подобно деяние и спасява България от изчезване. Не само това, но той в лицето на САЩ се обявява за връщане на България в границите ѝ от преди войната, без отцепване на територии от нея.
Томас Удроу Уилсън - човекът спасил България. Единственият президент в историята на САЩ поставен на банкнота от 100.000 долара.

[barbaron]

Пригожин ликвидира медийния си холдинг Patriot, който включваше известната фабрика за тролове

Холдингът включваше още РИА ФАН, "Народные новости", "Экономика сегодня" и много други издания.

В момента всички служители са в процес на уволнение.

Това е доста странен ход, който показва, че конфликтът не е приключил и Пригожин, с викове "така че не позволявайте на никого да ви хване", е решил да се отърве от фабриката, преди някой друг да се е докопал до нея.

Ако това наистина е така, всичко ще бъде наред. Сигурни сме, че целият свят ще въздъхне по-свободно, когато изчезнат десетките хиляди ботове, весело крещящи " смуча за Путин" на почти всички езици по света.

Има обаче и съмнения, тъй като инструментът се оказа наистина ефективен и вероятно "фабриката за тролове" ще бъде възродена под една или друга форма.

[Gerasim_Burgaski]

Самонавиваш се и се самозалъгваш: Щатите нямат интерес Китай да "погълне " Русия, т.к.следващите са те. Ще рече, правят каквото правят но, И на тях, Русия ще им трябва за ...подкрепа срещу китайското доминиране.
ОБРЕЧЕНИ СА да се държат едни за други. Виж, Европа, вече са я отписали.

Путин се НАСРА от един Пригожин, а ти ревеш как ще удари НАТО.

[Gerasim_Burgaski]

От рубриката: "Всичко върви по план": На 30 юни 2022 г. един долар е струвал 55 рубли. На 30 юни 2023 г. един долар струва 109 рубли. За една година рублата е паднала със 95%, но иначе всичко върви по план.

[petrg5s]

Рублата -6% за месеца ,като се търгува на нива по-високи отпреди войната !
Санкциите не оказвали ефект
русия била икономически тигър

[Mateev]

Украина получит F-18

Украйна ще получи самолети F-18 преди F-16. Що за самолет е това вижте в клипа.

[barbaron]

Почему ... решил пойти на обострение ситуации?
Потому что он реально был уверен в своей популярности, в том, что его поддержат в ... .

Разбрахме те, че намекваш за ... Путлер и за поддръжката му в Украина

[Pyramid]

[COLOR=#FF0000][B]Договарянето със Запада е не само вероятно, а критично необходимо за Русия, защото вече само НАТО може да спаси Русия от Китай!

Самонавиваш се и се самозалъгваш: Щатите нямат интерес Китай да "погълне " Русия, т.к.следващите са те. Ще рече, правят каквото правят но, И на тях, Русия ще им трябва за ...подкрепа срещу китайското доминиране.
ОБРЕЧЕНИ СА да се държат едни за други. Виж, Европа, вече са я отписали.

[Frosty]

https://ok.ru/video/5646606076544

живи погребани

[Gerasim_Burgaski]

И не минимални заплати, с тях държавата взема, с пенсиите дава и те го знаят затова ако искат и могат да им плащат 2 пъти повиски пенсии от руските ОК !

[COLOR=#FF0000][B]Договарянето със Запада е не само вероятно, а критично необходимо за Русия, защото вече само НАТО може да спаси Русия от Китай!

[Gerasim_Burgaski]

Руснаците искат тези области да се отделят в самостоятелна държава или да минат към Украйна когато тя се оправи и може да им плаща поне два пъти по високи пенсии от руските. Те са го решили, че няма да са към Русия и ако се обособят като самостоятелна призната държава ще се съгласят да дадат парите за възтановяването им те. Украинците въобще за какво точно се бият ? И на всичко отгоре договор ще се случи ако украинците дадат териториите в административните им граници, иначе пари руснаците няма да дадат. Та какво точно освобождава Украйна ? И Херсон ще го върнат без бой точно така както им го отстъпиха руснаците.

После, не били руZнацити крепостни селяндури дори и през 21-и век!?
Който тръгне с оръжие в русия и тълпата застава зад него ))))))))))))))))

[Tepix]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is amassing a large force near the Ukrainian border and
reportedly has a military plan to invade and conquer most of unoccupied Ukraine. Western
leaders are rightly taking the threat of such an invasion very seriously, and we cannot dismiss
the possibility that Putin will order his military to execute it. However, the close look at what
such an invasion would entail presented in this report and the risks and costs Putin would have
to accept in ordering it leads us to forecast that he is very unlikely to launch an invasion of
unoccupied Ukraine this winter. Putin is much more likely to send Russian forces into Belarus
and possibly overtly into Russian-occupied Donbas. He might launch a limited incursion into
unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion.
A full-scale Russian invasion of unoccupied Ukraine
would be by far the largest, boldest, and riskiest military
operation Moscow has launched since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. It would be far more complex than
the US wars against Iraq in 1991 or 2003. It would be a
marked departure from the approaches Putin has relied
on since 2015, and a major step-change in his willingness to use Russian conventional military power overtly.
It would cost Russia enormous sums of money and likely
many thousands of casualties and destroyed vehicles and
aircraft. Even in victory, such an invasion would impose
on Russian President Vladimir Putin the requirement to
reconstruct Ukraine and then establish a new government
and security forces there more suitable for his objectives.
We continue to assess for all these reasons that Putin
does not, in fact, intend to invade unoccupied Ukraine
this winter despite the continued build-up of Russian
forces in preparation to do so.
A full-scale Russian invasion would consist of numerous discrete operations, almost every one of which
could also be conducted independently of the others
to achieve more limited objectives at lesser cost and
risk. The most salient of those operations include, in
order from most- to least-likely:
• Deploying Russian airborne and/or mechanized
units to one or more locations in Belarus that
would support a planned attack on Ukraine as well
as pose other threats to NATO member states;
• Deploying Russian mechanized, tank, artillery,
and support units overtly into occupied Donbas;
• Breaking out from occupied Donbas to establish a land bridge connecting Russian-occupied
Crimea with Russian territory near Rostov along
the northern Sea of Azov littoral, as well as
seizing the Kherson region north of Crimea and
securing the Dnepr-Crimea canal;
• Conducting airborne and amphibious operations to seize Odesa and the western Ukrainian
Black Sea coast; and
• Launching a mechanized drive to seize the strategic city of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine.
Putin will very likely deploy Russian troops into Belarus
this winter. He has set all the necessary informational
and military conditions to do so and is likely simply
waiting for what he judges to be the right moment. Such
a move could dramatically increase the challenge NATO
faces defending the Baltic States from future Russian
attack because it would put Russian mechanized units
on both sides of the narrow Suwalki Corridor through
which NATO supplies and reinforcements to the Baltic
States must run. It would also set conditions for future
threats to invade Ukraine along an axis that would enable
Russian troops to envelop Kyiv from the west. And
it would put additional Russian troops on the Polish
border, increasing the threat to NATO’s eastern flank.
Putin and Russian officials are actively setting informational conditions to move Russian troops overtly into
occupied Donbas. Russian forces are already covertly
there, to be sure. An overt deployment would let Putin
bring in much more combat power that would pose
a more immediate and serious threat to unoccupied
Ukraine. Military conditions are likely already set both
in occupied Donbas and among the troops that would
deploy there. Putin need not fear unrest in occupied
Donbas because of its pro-Russian sentiments and
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 9
DECEMBER 2021
the firm control he has established over it through his
proxies and agents. The overt deployment of Russian
forces there would put great domestic pressure on
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from two
directions. Anti-Russian Ukrainians and the Ukrainian
military would demand a response and serious preparations to defend against a possible Russian attack. Western
leaders would likely press Zelensky not to respond so as
to avoid “escalating” the conflict or disrupting diplomatic efforts underway to de-escalate it. These pressures
could set conditions for what we assess to be Putin’s preferred course of action, which focuses on undermining
Zelensky and the current Ukrainian political environment in advance of Ukrainian parliamentary and
presidential elections in 2023 and 2024 respectively.
We will explore this preferred course of action in the
next report in this series. Such efforts would also make
a future Russian invasion of unoccupied Ukraine somewhat easier than it is at present.
All other Russian military options involve attacking
one or more areas of unoccupied Ukraine and would
therefore constitute renewed overt Russian aggression
not seen since 2014-2015. These military operations
would create tremendous pressure on Zelensky and the
Ukrainian military, confront NATO and the United
States with very unpleasant and difficult choices, and
set conditions for future Russian military operations
against Ukraine. They would also pose serious risks to
Putin, however. They would certainly generate Russian
casualties and cause losses of expensive equipment that
Russia can ill-afford to replace. Putin might nevertheless accept these risks and costs in individual limited
attacks, particularly those that offer him reliable ways to
stop his advances and declare victory early on if things
appear likely to go poorly for him.
The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov
to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this
respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him
control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly
needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do
fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupting key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to
the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an
important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area
around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol
just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas.
The other two possible courses of action are much
more dangerous and much less susceptible to early
termination. With regard to the seizure of Odesa,
amphibious and airborne attacks are inherently risky,
no matter how well-rehearsed and prepared. The drive
on Kharkiv minimizes those risks but imposes the very
real challenge of seizing and holding a city of more than
1.5 million people. We assess that Putin is unlikely to
conduct either of these courses of action independently
of a full-scale invasion.
Putin will surely continue to build up the capabilities
he would need to conduct the full-scale invasion of
Ukraine over the course of this winter. He gains tremendous leverage with the West in doing so and allows
his military time to set conditions for a much more rapid
build-up and attack against Ukraine or NATO states in
the future, since we forecast he will likely leave elements
of his mobilized forces in place at the end of this crisis.
The continued military deployments themselves are
not, therefore, the indicators we should be watching to determine Putin’s intent. We should instead be
watching the information conditions he is setting in
Ukraine, Russia, and the West, as discussed in Part I
of this series. If Putin is serious about seizing all or
most of unoccupied Ukraine, he will be setting conditions for the post-war governance of that area as well.
Western and Ukrainian intelligence should focus on
indicators that he is doing so, many of which will be
hard to observe in the open source.
The art of deterring Putin lies in adding sufficient risk
to his undertakings while offering the most limited possible negotiated concessions. Western negotiators and
policymakers must internalize the extreme risks and
costs to Russia that are inherent in a full-scale invasion
of Ukraine to avoid conceding to or threatening Russia
more than is needed to deter an attack Putin probably
does not intend to launch.
Putin is trying to panic the West into surrendering
important principles and accepting Russian actions
that would damage Western interests and security
severely but would seem less dangerous when compared to the massive threat Putin is presenting to
Ukraine. Western leaders must avoid becoming mesmerized by the threat of a Russian invasion while
cajoling Putin to de-escalate the crisis he has created.
10 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG
Putin’s Military Options
Imagining what a full-scale Russian invasion of unoccupied Ukraine would look like is one of the biggest
challenges in the current policy discourse. Many
leaders and analysts likely underestimate the changes
such an attack could trigger in Western and global
attitudes and decision-making. Words on paper and
abstract discussions ignore the emotional impact of
pictures, videos, and sounds. The full-scale invasion
of unoccupied Ukraine would be a global crisis of the
first order. It would be the largest conventional war
since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. It would be
a far more complicated military undertaking than
either US war with Iraq and involve fighting for and
probably in several cities of a million people or more.
The world would see videos of long tank and mechanized vehicle columns moving along multiple axes
with Russian aircraft bombing cities and Ukrainian
military positions. It would almost certainly cost
tens of thousands of lives and generate yet another
large migration crisis. It would likely rivet the world’s
attention on Russian aggression and brutality as few
events have done before.
The pressure on Western leaders to act would likely
grow steadily as Russian forces either encircled
Ukrainian cities and sought to force them to capitulate through brutal campaigns
causing humanitarian catastrophe
or fought through those cities,
wrecking them in the process and
sending millions of Ukrainians
fleeing. The United States would
likely follow through on some of
its threats to impose high levels of
economic pain on Russia. NATO
would likely deploy additional
military forces to its easternmost
members and publicly recommit
to their defense—a development
Putin explicitly seeks to avoid. A coalition of the
willing would likely increase defense aid to Ukraine
and might even engage militarily in limited ways.
Considering this scenario today, in peacetime,
when it is only a scary hypothetical, we are more
likely to underestimate the Western reaction than to
overestimate it.
Every single one of these likely Western reactions
undermines a core geostrategic objective Putin is
pursuing. The movement of forces of the western
NATO states to the east and the commitment of
A bright line separates
overt Russian
deployments into
Belarus and Donbas
from a Russian invasion
of unoccupied Ukraine.
CRITICALTHREATS.ORG 29
DECEMBER 2021
those states to defending their eastern partners
would undo the progress Putin has made in driving
a wedge through the alliance. A US commitment
to defending threatened NATO states would undo
progress Putin has made and seeks to expand in
dividing the United States from its European allies.
The shock effect of Putin ripping off the mask
and hurling tank columns overtly in a large-scale
invasion might well reduce the will of Ukrainians
and their allies to fight, but the images of Russian
armor ripping through Ukraine and the devastation
wrought on Ukraine’s cities and
people would be burned indelibly
into the minds of Ukrainians, other
former Soviet states, and the West.
That experience would permanently harm future Russian hybrid
war efforts and strip the veneer off
much of Putin’s cherished deniability for his actions.
There is precedent for this assessment. Russian operations in 2014
fundamentally altered Western perceptions of Putin and transformed
the Ukrainian scene. This kind of
invasion would almost certainly
generate a much greater example of
that phenomenon.
An overt invasion of unoccupied Ukraine, especially
on the massive scale outlined in the leaked plan,
would throw away the approach Putin has pursued
and improved on for two decades and launch Russia
into a new mode of interacting with the world.
Putin himself might prefer that mode, although he has
never given any sign of it. But he would be putting
himself at a disadvantage that he and his military
often recognizes. Once Russia becomes primarily a
conventional threat that has to operate mainly on
the conventional plane it must confront its almost
insurmountable economic and demographic disadvantages. Moving onto that plane invites NATO to
see that fact clearly and take appropriate countermeasures. Putin could mitigate that risk in various
ways, including by increasing his threats of nuclear
war or cyberattack, but he would
have severely damaged his ability
to continue making gains at very
low cost and entered the realm of
high-risk, high-cost options. These
reflections are the basis of our
assessment that Putin is unlikely to
pursue this conventional option in
a straightforward manner, at least
as long as the threat of invasion
alone supports other plausible ways
for him to pursue his objectives.

[v_tin]