Валутна търговия - FOREX Архив 2.28

[kiril123]

zdraweite проспал съм всичко ) гледам имало е спад по евро фронтовете и сега ми се върти идеята понеже вече и е мало спад до този момент дали не е удачно преди новините да се влезе на дълго или в евро или в кабел тъи като ако новините са за силен долар спада е паунда за един ден току виж станал 4 фигури което ми се вижда твърде много

според мен този паунд след кратка корекция ще го видим на около 2.0330 днес макс . ама ..... то се не знае

[trade]

zdraweite проспал съм всичко ) гледам имало е спад по евро фронтовете и сега ми се върти идеята понеже вече и е мало спад до този момент дали не е удачно преди новините да се влезе на дълго или в евро или в кабел тъи като ако новините са за силен долар спада е паунда за един ден току виж станал 4 фигури което ми се вижда твърде много сега като погледна х дневна графика забелязах и че сме на подкрепа макар че при паунда тия работи мн мн не работят

[kiril123]

zdraweite kolegi,

az tazi sedmica neshto ne moga da se pozicioniram w eur/usd .Bih kupuwal nad 4762 s celi 4920.Za momenta ochakwam po-skoro edno spuskane do 4678/69 ot kudeto bih opital dulgi ewentualno.Inache gledam usd/cad se e otprawil kum 1.08 stremglawo.
Pod 4620 shte spra da mislia za 1.49 i shte faworiziram kusite.

вчера този долар /канадец ми удари стопа и после за 20-30 пипа не иска да ми удари покупката и затова съм му сърдит. имам известни съмнения за слизате до 1 .010 и там съм разположил една покупка с къс 40 пипона стоп. относно евро /долар много мислят като тебе да купуват над 1.4762 и това ще ви бъде грешка ако нямате 20-30 пипона стопове , иначе може да се отлети с 1-2-3 фигури ето така за спорта .

успех

[masagor]

zdraweite kolegi,

az tazi sedmica neshto ne moga da se pozicioniram w eur/usd .Bih kupuwal nad 4762 s celi 4920.Za momenta ochakwam po-skoro edno spuskane do 4678/69 ot kudeto bih opital dulgi ewentualno.Inache gledam usd/cad se e otprawil kum 1.08 stremglawo.
Pod 4620 shte spra da mislia za 1.49 i shte faworiziram kusite.

[kiril123]

замислям се дали днес нама да се получи следното нещо около 17 часа . излизат слаби данни за ИСМ за долара и виждаме 1.4820 при евро долар...

ИСМ-ма ще е слаб защото няма какъв друг да бъде в момента. Въпросът е колко слаб ще е? Но и това няма особено голямо значение, защото от тук отиваме на 1,45 и след това отново към 1,50. Предвиждам че това ще е рамката за търговия до края на годината.

Много по-интересно ще е в други валутни двойки като любимите на керитата... Ще имаме също така доста силно низходящо движение в евро/шв. франк до такава степен че може да има разнопосочно движение на двете валути спрямо долара!

Ако сте десперадо по душа мятайте се на паунд/швейцарец или на австралиец/йена. И двете са за силно скъсяване с прилично отдалечен стоп и държане на позицията поне до 27-ми този месец въпреки суаповата балтия.

мерси колега , видях оцених и скъсих , но с цел 2.27 за паунд /швейцарец . защото там е важно според мен и след това ниво има малко път за 2.2930-40 . иначе позицията е малка 10к от 2.0822 . ако пробие 2.2760 ще сложа стоп на 0 иначе сега е 40 пипона .

[the fan*]

....нека преди това да видим данните в 14.00, 14.30, 15.15 (жокера за петък) и в 15.30... да отвори борсата...и тогава идва твоят час..

ти за утре ли гоовориш , защото днес няма никакви данни в 14 часа

US mortgage mkt....index...change... refinancing....

[Facts]

замислям се дали днес нама да се получи следното нещо около 17 часа . излизат слаби данни за ИСМ за долара и виждаме 1.4820 при евро долар...

ИСМ-ма ще е слаб защото няма какъв друг да бъде в момента. Въпросът е колко слаб ще е? Но и това няма особено голямо значение, защото от тук отиваме на 1,45 и след това отново към 1,50. Предвиждам че това ще е рамката за търговия до края на годината.

Много по-интересно ще е в други валутни двойки като любимите на керитата... Ще имаме също така доста силно низходящо движение в евро/шв. франк до такава степен че може да има разнопосочно движение на двете валути спрямо долара!

Ако сте десперадо по душа мятайте се на паунд/швейцарец или на австралиец/йена. И двете са за силно скъсяване с прилично отдалечен стоп и държане на позицията поне до 27-ми този месец въпреки суаповата балтия.

[kiril123]

....нека преди това да видим данните в 14.00, 14.30, 15.15 (жокера за петък) и в 15.30... да отвори борсата...и тогава идва твоят час..

ти за утре ли гоовориш , защото днес няма никакви данни в 14 часа

[the fan*]

....нека преди това да видим данните в 14.00, 14.30, 15.15 (жокера за петък) и в 15.30... да отвори борсата...и тогава идва твоят час..

[kiril123]

замислям се дали днес нама да се получи следното нещо около 17 часа . излизат слаби данни за ИСМ за долара и виждаме 1.4820 при евро долар за да може да си позатворят позиции на добри нива големите риби . после задържаме на 1.48 но не под 1.4780 за да можеме ние да си мислиме как бихме корекциата и сега ще имаме 1.50 ниво и голям прпфит . точно тогава започват да затварят големи позции и още днес сме на 1.4650-60 и утре 1.4540-50 . за да може преди новините да имаме 1.45-40 нива откъдетоп да могат те пак да си заредят вече за 1.50-52 . Щото никой маркет мейкър няма да купува тука , те продават от 1.44 чак до 1.49 и вече идва момента да съберат стопове и да закарат курса на подходящите за тях нива за да създадат постановка за обърнат пазар и така ... нататък . предполагам ми разбирате мисълта

успех

[kiril123]

забележете практиката . когато бяхме на 1.35 и имаше анкета ще видим ли 1.40 или там каквото беше 60-70 процента бяха че няма да го видим . Резултата Видяхме го .

Сега има 1.51 с 60 и няколко процента дали ще го видим . Ами май да не стане същото като миналия път

просто наблюдения

успех

[kiril123]

при евро долар и паунд /долар , особено второтосе оформят триъгълници които ще ни закарат някъде . според мен този при паунда ще се пробие нагоре в близките 30 минути и цлта ще бъде 2.0440-50 . имемно там ще скъся с 20-30 пипона за ново дъно или дори за 2.00 .

поздрави

[kiril123]

между другото при паунд/йена 224.50 е 61.8 фибо от покаването от 221.30 до 229.30 и ми сле струва че ще го тества още един път и ако не го пробие ще направуим някаква по-голяма корекция . така че мисля да го ползвам като пивотче за момента .

узпех

[Heraclitus]

@kiril 123

.....................
This section looks into various risks transmitted by foreign banks in emerging
Europe.


Mispricing of risk can arise as banks are run as European-wide conglomerates in terms of
risk management, while macroeconomic consequences of financial turmoil in their (small)
subsidiaries fall on host
countries. The perception
of risk of a given exposure
in SEE may be small for a
European financial
conglomerate, but large
for the small host country.
Other sources of potential
risk mispricing include the
quest for short-term
profits and market share,
and high concentration of
funding:

11 There are no data on household equity holdings, but these are assumed to be small, at least in foreign currency. The
data may also underestimate household assets, if they have holdings abroad, money under mattresses, or capital in the
informal sector. There are no data on household savings in SEE.
12 The discussion does not distinguish between branches or subsidiaries in host countries. While this distinction is
important for supervision and crisis management, from the parents’ perspective, the increasing centralization of
business operations at the group level makes the corporate structure less relevant operationally, all else being equal. See
Dermine (2006) for a review of determinants of corporate structure, Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Martinez Peria (2005) for
trends in this area, and GFSR (2007) for risk implications of financial globalization in emerging markets.
Total US$ bn Austria France Germany Italy Netherlands Switzerland
Creditor country banks' share in foreign exposure of
Bulgaria 19 18 6 6 11 2 11
Croatia 63 40 11 6 36 0 0
Romania 93 38 11 20 4 6 4
Serbia 13 44 5 3 13 1 8
SEE 191 37 10 12 16 3 4
CEE5 445 24 9 15 10 6 1
Baltics 84 2 0 7 0 0 0
Share in creditor country banks' foreign exposure of
Bulgaria 1 0 0 1 0 0
Croatia 6 0 0 5 0 0
Romania 9 0 1 1 0 0
Serbia 2 0 0 0 0 0
SEE 18 1 1 7 0 0
Source: BIS
BIS banks' exposure to SEE and other emerging Europe, December 2006
(Percent, unless otherwise indicated)
18
• The drive of European parent banks to complement limited earnings opportunities at
home with high profits from emerging Europe may have led to risk under-pricing.
Foreign banks tend to earn a large part of their aggregated profits in SEE on a fraction of
total assets. According to some banks, this has led parents to set high return on equity (ROE)
targets for their affiliates in SEE—between 20 to 25 percent before tax, compared with an
EU average of 14 percent. To meet the profit and market share targets, local managers may
have an incentive to generate rapid loan growth while downplaying risks and thus
provisions—a mechanism that has also been at work in the US mortgage sector in recent
years. While contributing to higher profits, this mechanism can lead to a potential build-up
of credit risk in banks’ balance sheets.
• This underpricing may be compounded by limited data on creditworthiness and weak
institutions in SEE. Due to poor accounting and auditing standards, unreliable financial
disclosure, and absent or incomplete credit registries, data on borrowers’ creditworthiness
are often missing or insufficient in SEE countries. As foreign banks cannot use their
standard risk tools to measure credit risk, local managers may be forced to rely on judgment,
and parent banks may not be able to independently validate the risk pricing applied in their
subsidiaries.
• Foreign banks’ centralized risk management systems can further contribute to risk
mispricing from the hosts’ perspective in group-wide risk assessments. Many foreign
banks operate their foreign affiliates as branches, with central management of lending and
treasury operations (GFSR, April 2007). This centralization may lead parent banks to
underprice risks in a small foreign affiliate as risks are managed according to the group’s
capacity to absorb shocks, and not the affiliates.13 This bias is aggravated by large
asymmetries in risk exposure—SEE exposures are only a fraction of total assets of most
foreign banks. Thus a shock with a minor impact on the group can have major consequences
for the host country, especially if the affiliate is systemically important locally.
• Consolidated supervision at the group level may also focus on risks for parent banks
rather than risks for host countries. Local supervisors tend to rely on parent banks’ home
supervisors to monitor changes in the risk profile of their foreign affiliates. Home
supervision, however, is mostly done on a consolidated risk basis, focusing on a parent’s
ability to absorb a wide range of shocks—rather than on the impact of the shock on
affiliates. As a result, home supervisors may not take specific actions or provide relevant
information to host supervisors in a timely manner, with potentially significant
consequences for the local financial system.
13 In particular, under Basel II, the risk weights attached to a bank's foreign exposures tend to reflect only the
idiosyncratic risk of each host country—not the vulnerability of a group's overall exposure to a common shock, which is
more difficult to quantify and which depends on return correlations. Furthermore, bank groups can deduct their
estimated international diversification benefits from their group-wide capital requirements; however, there remain large
uncertainties about how these benefits are to be measured and how robust they are. The need to carefully manage risks
in banks with foreign exposures in Eastern Europe is also discussed in Hilbers and Tieman (2007).
19
• The regional concentration of funding increases contagion risks in host countries. 11
foreign bank groups account for over 70 percent of total SEE bank assets, and even larger
shares of credit, in all but Serbia (Figure 6). As a result, new information or developments in
other markets may lead parents to change their exposure to a particular foreign affiliate,
regardless of its performance.
• Foreign banks’ funding structures may also have raised currency risks in the region.
To match foreign liabilities, mostly from their parents, banks often prefer foreign currency
or euro-indexed loans to reduce currency mismatches in their balance sheets. The large
mismatches in the corporate sector and inflows of foreign currency credit to nontradables
sectors suggest that this practice may have led to large indirect currency risks in banks’
balance sheets that may be largely unprovisioned, either because of insufficient data or
institutional arrangements. For example, in view of its currency board arrangement,
supervisors in Bulgaria do not consider euro loans as foreign currency loans.
• Empirical evidence confirms some of these points.14 While it is generally believed that
foreign banks provide financing with domestic shocks in host countries, studies that extend
the analysis to shocks in the home country or other host countries find that the picture is
more nuanced. Peek and Rosengren (1997) discovered that, when Japanese banks suffered
capital losses after a sharp drop in the stock market, local lending in their U.S. subsidiaries
was reduced by more than in their home market. Other studies show that contagion can be
important, as changes in claims on individual host countries have been correlated with those
in other host countries (Martinez Peria and others, 2005; and Van Rijckeghem and Weder,
2003). In Croatia, when Rijecka Banka, a foreign subsidiary of German Bayerische
Landesbank Girozentrale, suffered large currency losses in 2002 the parent bank did not
come to the rescue. While there are likely to be several counter examples, this suggests that
foreign banks are not always acting as lenders of last resort to their subsidiaries.
• To quantify the potential risk transfers by foreign banks, the study attempted to use
the contingent claims approach (CCA). The CCA provides a framework that combines
forward-looking market information and balance sheet data to evaluate risk transmission
between sectors or entities. However, data deficiencies in SEE (small number of listed
companies, etc.) did not allow for a comprehensive assessment. Instead, Box 2 provides an
overview of the methodology with a case study on Bulgaria, the further development of
which could be an important tool for SEE authorities to assess vulnerabilities.
32. Sudden stops and growth reversals could be triggered by several factors in SEE. They
can be exogenous—such as adverse regional or global economic or political events—or internal
domestic developments, such as policy mistakes. In either case, a loss of confidence could trigger a
sudden and large portfolio adjustment—a sudden stop. Such triggers in SEE could be a sudden
14 Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) have found that foreign banks sustain a higher credit growth and lower lending
volatility than their domestic counterparts in crisis periods. Similarly, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2000) have found that
foreign bank claims did not seem to retrench during recent crises in Central and Eastern Europe. Claessens and others
(2001) review the literature on the role of foreign banks in transmitting financial contagion.
20
unwinding of global imbalances and disorderly exchange rate adjustment, loss of competitiveness,
slowdown in world growth, increase in risk premiums, difficulties in parent banks’ home or other
foreign markets, or a fundamental reassessment of SEE prospects of joining the EMU (Bulgaria) or
EU (Croatia, Serbia). SEE may be less affected by a liquidity shock than risk repricing and growth
shocks—capital markets remain underdeveloped, portfolio inflows are insignificant, and foreign
bank exposure to the region remains a small share of their total exposure with high profits. In
contrast, a reappraisal of risk in emerging Europe can trigger changes in supply and demand for
credit, which can be reinforced by the concentration of the inflows in a few foreign banks and
countries. A growth shock or a decline in housing prices, or just a reduction in new credit, can
trigger large adjustments in demand in SEE due to the high reliance on foreign savings in the
enterprise and banking sectors.

source : IMF

[Heraclitus]

хм вие добре говорите за чуждите кризи , ами в България какво мислите ще се случи . Всичко взима кредити дето плаща 10 % годишно . Банките раздават раздават ама ако дойде момента да се теглят пари какво ще стане , имат ли ликвидност . отговора е че имат ама май само на теория ама ако стане като в Англия ще бъде супер забавно . Преди време като решиш да идеш в някоя банка да изтеглиш 10000 лева без заявка винаги имат . хайде сега без заявка да иде някой да тегли ще те пратят в централния офис щото офисът бил малък и не държат толкова много забележете пари в него .

това е интересна тема . ще ми се да я покоментираме ако има желаещи за това .

Поздрави

@kiril123

Box 2. The Contingent Claims Approach (CCA) and Vulnerabilities in Bulgaria
CCA framework is used to assess the role of foreign banks in SEE in transferring risks across sectors. Based on the
Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing theory, it combines forward-looking market information and balance sheet data to
capture the non-linear nature of risk transmission between sectors or entities.
However, the lack of detailed market and accounting data in SEE allows only for a stylized CCA-type exercise. This
was conducted for Bulgaria using publicly available data whenever possible and supplementing remaining gaps by estimates
(over 80 percent of SEE bank loans are from foreign subsidiaries for which no traded equity data is available). In this
framework, foreign banks contribute to financial stability risks through two channels: (i) rapid credit growth, which
generates large exposures by the corporate sector to banks with potential credit risk buildup; and (ii) foreign banks’ reliance
on foreign funding to finance their credit expansion, which generates large parent-affiliate exposures and a vulnerability to a
sudden stop. Owing to data constraints, it is important to note that the results are only an indication of how particular risk
transfer mechanisms work, rather than a strict quantification of their potential impact.
Foreign banks seem resilient to a sizable deterioration in loan quality, provided the shock is limited to credit risk. If
concerns about credit risk buildup rise, banks are likely to respond by shortening the maturities of their private sector claims
and by refusing debt rollovers (shock 1). This would raise credit spreads in the corporate sector (by 300 bp) but have little
impact on foreign banks’ spreads (equity value (MVE) would fall by 5 percent and spreads would rise by 5 bp). If the credit
risks materialize and the value of corporate assets (MVA) declines by 20 percent (shock 2), the market value of the foreign
banks’ equity falls by 19 percent, and credit spreads increase by 24 basis points, which would be sustainable. However, if
the credit risks were to spread and affect 25 percent of the banks’ other assets simultaneously, the value of their equity could
fall by 55 percent (shock 3).
Fall in Rollover Fall in
Shock Corporate Liquidity Bank EL/A Spread % chg Spread % chg % chg Spread
Assets (%) Assets (%) MVA MVE MVA
0 0 High 0 1.0 164 0.0 97 0.0 0.0 109
1 0 Low 0 3.6 469 -1.6 104 -4.6 -1.3 118
2 20 Low 0 14.4 1,501 -6.4 127 -18.9 -5.4 149
3 20 Low 25 14.4 1,501 -19.0 220 -55.1 -19.8 322
Corporates FOB DOB
The results also suggest that financial markets expect foreign subsidiaries to be supported financially by their parent
banks in case of financial distress. In the baseline, the corporate sector has the largest credit spread (164 basis points),
followed by domestic banks (DOB-109 basis points) and foreign-owned banks (FOB-97 basis points). As credit spreads rise,
the margin between domestic- and foreign-owned banks widens significantly, reflecting the implicit guarantee of bank
groups to their affiliates.
If corporate losses are funded through current and future profits, they could significantly impact banks’ profitability.
Expected losses must be provisioned, either by drawing down profits and/or capital buffers, resulting in a lower expected
ROE, which, if significant, could lead parent banks to curtail lending in that market. Assuming that all corporate losses not
reflected in a lower equity market value are absorbed by current and future profits, a 20 percent fall in corporate assets
would halve ROE, but not affect future profits (shock 4). A 40 percent fall, however, would wipe out current profits and
possibly next year’s profits as well (shock 5).
In EUR
mio
Pre Post Change
(%)
Change
Shock 4 MVA 13460 13249 -1.6 -211
MVE 2947 2811 -4.6 -136
Profits 146 71 -51.2 -75 0
ROE 5.0 2.5 -48.9
Shock 5 MVA 13460 12594 -6.4 -866
MVE 2947 2390 -18.9 -557
Profits 146 0 -100.0 -146 -163
ROE 5.0 0 -100.0
Losses absorbed by
future profıt
If capital allocation by parent banks depends on their foreign affiliates’ ability to meet certain ROE targets, shocks
to ROE could reduce their credit expansion. If foreign banks stop lending, the net international reserves-to-GDP ratio
could fall by 36 percent, assuming that all additional credit is funded from abroad. However, the macroeconomic effects of
slower credit growth are difficult to model, as they depend on a number of factors, such as the source of the shock, country
risk, size of exposure to a country, and banks’ long-term strategic objectives in the region. Furthermore, as it is impossible to
estimate the probability or size of these shocks with any degree of precision, close surveillance of these risks is essential.